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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
Its Historic Context and Shifting
Constitutional Principles
Cotton C. Harness, III*
In 1986, David Lucas purchased two lots on the Isle of
Palms, South Carolina, a barrier island north of the port city
of Charleston. The lots are located on the beachfront in a
closed-gate community called Wild Dunes, a development in
which Mr. Lucas was intimately involved. About eighteen
months after he purchased the lots, South Carolina passed the
1988 Beachfront Management Act,1 which had as its primary
purpose the prevention of construction and reconstruction in
high hazard areas on the state's beach/dune system. The Act
imposed a setback scheme that prevented Mr. Lucas from
building any permanent structures on his beachfront lots
other than a walkway and small deck.
The Act was passed in response to a serious problem of
near-shore development along the South Carolina coastline.'
Due to the fact that too little statutory authority had been
* Cotton C. Harness received his Juris Doctor degree in 1975 from the Univer-
sity of South Carolina Law School. After 10 years in private practice he became Gen-
eral Counsel of the South Carolina Coastal Council. A resident of Mount Pleasant,
South Carolina, he was the attorney for the Lucas case, and has litigated over 30
takings cases in the past three years.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39 (Law. Co-op. 1987 and Supp. 1991).
2. "The Blue Ribbon Committee Report on Beachfront Management," March
1987.
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given under the 1977 Coastal Zone Management Act to the
implementing agency, the South Carolina Coastal Council,
much development had taken place very close to the shore.
This ill-planned development was highly vulnerable to erosion
and storms and caused a deterioration of the natural system,
which in turn exacerbated the problems associated with such
erosion and storms.8 Aside from concerns over life and prop-
erty, the legislature recognized that this near-shore develop-
ment was destroying the beaches of the state, which support a
strong tourist industry, provide recreation for residents and
visitors, and provide a habitat for plant and animal life. The
Act sought to implement a gradual retreat from the shoreline
over a forty-year period in order to protect and restore the
beach/dune system and to eliminate construction in "critical"
areas.
4
Mr. Lucas filed a suit in the Court of Common Pleas of
Charleston County alleging loss of "all economically viable
use" of the property. Recognizing that the goals of the Act
were laudable, he maintained that the loss of use and the dim-
inution of the value of his property, without any consideration
for the nature of the government action or the harms that
were prevented by the Act, amounted to a taking pursuant to
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
court agreed and awarded him over 1.2 million dollars.
The case was appealed to the South Carolina State Su-
preme Court. Relying upon an old line of cases beginning with
Mugler v. Kansas,' the Court concluded that no taking had
occurred. This was based upon the Court's reading of prior
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that recognized that takings,
with the exception of situations in which there is a permanent
invasion of property by government,' require a balancing of
the government interest and private loss. The Court reasoned
that because Mr. Lucas never challenged the governmental
purpose, and indeed conceded its importance, he had
3. Id.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10.
5. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
6. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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presented the Court with only one side of the takings equa-
tion. As a consequence, the Court could not sua sponte sec-
ond-guess the legislative findings that great public harm was
created by the near-shore construction proposed by Lucas.
Since diminution in value has never been sufficient in and of
itself to constitute a taking, Lucas failed to properly present
his case for review. Lucas then filed a writ of certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court. The purpose of this essay is not to re-
hash the much discussed formula for takings law or to analyze
what the Court held. Instead, I want to put the Lucas case in
a historic perspective and to point out that the economic
agenda put forth by some members of the Court threatens to
supplant traditional views of the individual's relationship to
the community and the Court's relationship to the legislature.
The philosophic shift in the Court does not bode well for reg-
ulation of the environment. As will be discussed in more de-
tail, the shift focuses more on the property interests of the
individual and less on the obligation that the individual has to
the community to use his property in a way that does not
harm others. Secondly, the shift attempts to use the Fifth
Amendment as a constitutional tool upon which to balance
public and private rights, a use which has no real basis in his-
tory or in practical application. Finally, the Court may be re-
turning to the intrusive substantive due process analysis of
the Lochner era, when the Court substituted its own judg-
ment for that of the legislature in order to promote a laissez-
faire economic theory in place of sound constitutional princi-
ples which were based upon deference to the legislative
branch.
Until the turn of the 19th century, takings law was not in
a muddle. Indeed, it was very clear. There was no application
of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause unless
there had been a permanent physical invasion.8 The govern-
ment could exercise its police power to protect the health,
safety and welfare of the community subject only to the dic-
tates of the Due Process Clause, which required simply that
7. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896-902 (S.C. 1991).
8. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
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the law be rational. Equally important, however, was the prin-
ciple that redress for overreaching of such a legislative exer-
cise of police power affecting property could only be had at
the polls, not in the courts.0
These principles were based upon a long republican tradi-
tion in this country. The republican theory of property found
its most forceful spokesman in Thomas Jefferson, who repre-
sented the predominant view regarding the relationship be-
tween private and public interest in property. Recognizing
that humans are socially interdependent, Jefferson believed
that all property was owned subject to an implied obligation
that it be used in a manner beneficial to the community.
Property rights, he concluded, are derived from the state and,
as a matter of principle, the property owner cannot complain
when the state regulates it for the common good.'0 This view
of property comports with Jefferson's view that the earth is
held in common stock for all men and future generations.
This emphasis on the rights of the community over claims of
the individual property owner was best summarized by Benja-
min Franklin, who in 1785 stated:
Private property... is a creature of society, and subject
to the calls of that society, whenever its necessities shall
require it, even to its last farthing; its contributions there-
fore to the public exigencies are not to be considered as
conferring a benefit on the public, entitling the contribu-
tors to the distinctions of honor and power, but as return
of an obligation previously received for payment of a just
debt."
Against this backdrop of republican thought, none of the
original state constitutions contained just compensation
clauses. The idea that the government should compensate for
9. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
10. William M. Treanor, Comment, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985); see
also Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward A "Broader Vision" of
Property Rights, 37 KAN. L. REV. 529 (1989).
11. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 135, 138 (A.
Smyth ed. 1906).
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abridgement of property rights was developed by property
owners in response to military seizures during the Revolution-
ary War. The movement was led by Alexander Hamilton, and
called for protection of private property rights, which were
distilled in the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause.
At that time, it was generally conceded that the Fifth Amend-
ment applied only to physical invasions of property by the
federal government.12
Until 1887, there were few legal challenges to the exercise
of police power based upon the notion that compensation is
required when government regulates property. This most cer-
tainly was due to the vastness of the country, the small popu-
lation, and the lack of need for governmental regulation, but
was also due in part to the continuing power of republican
thought.
In 1889, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case de-
fining the limits of the police power in Mugler v. Kansas.13
Kansas passed a constitutional amendment and supporting
legislation that prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxi-
cating liquors. Mugler's investment in machinery was ren-
dered virtually valueless. In an opinion reminiscent of the re-
publican theory that private property is held in trust for the
public good, Justice Harlan made his now famous statement
that "all property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to
the community. '1 4
He went on to amplify this theme:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for pur-
poses that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injuri-
ous to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an ap-
propriation of property for the public benefit. Such legis-
lation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of
his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that
12. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 665.
19921
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its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes is prej-
udicial to the public interests . . . [t]he power which the
States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals,
or the safety of the public, is not - and, consistently with
the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be
- burdened with the condition that the State must com-
pensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they
may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a
noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community. 15
The Mugler principle, so eloquently stated by Justice
Harlan, was amplified by the Court in Munn v. Illinois.16 Jus-
tice Waite, in holding that the state of Illinois could impose
maximum rates that owners of grain warehouses could charge
users, concluded that this regulation was an appropriate exer-
cise of police power, and then went much further. He denied
that the Court had the constitutional power to redress
problems associated with the exercise of public power. He
stated, "[w]e know that this is a power which may be abused;
but that is no argument against its existence. For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts. ' '17
The republican ideology, which looked to the common
good as determined by the body politic closest to the people,
reached its zenith in Munn. However, the fall of the legisla-
tive prerogative was soon to come, riding the wave of great
social and ideological changes, brought on by the industriali-
zation and urbanization of America during the latter part of
the 19th century. As pointed out by Professor Patrick C. Mc-
Ginley in his analysis of the era, "[tihis radically changing ec-
onomic base caused a rethinking of many traditional legal
concepts."18 While the public was very interested in reining in
15. Id. at 668-69.
16. 94 U.S. at 113.
17. Id. at 134.
18. Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory "Takings". The Remarkable Resurrection
of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in Constitutional Law, 17 ENV'L. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,369, 10,372 (Sept. 1987).
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the excesses of economic power created during the great ex-
pansion in the 1880's and 1890's, jurists became alarmed at
the breadth of cases like Munn, fearing that broad legislative
power would impede economic growth and offend the laissez-
faire theories prevalent in that day.1
While cases like Mugler and Munn rejected substantive
due process restraints on legislative control of commercial en-
terprise, the Court, at the turn of the 19th century, began to
use the Due Process Clause in reverse to augment the power it
used to support commercial enterprise. In 1905, after several
preliminary efforts at controlling police power, the Court
turned the old republican constitutional theories on their ear
and began over thirty years of intrusive second-guessing of
state legislative acts by application of the substantive Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Lochner v. New York,'0 the Court struck down a New
York law limiting the work hours of persons employed by bak-
eries. Decrying the seemingly limitless power of legislatures to
control the lives and property of people, the Court held that
the right of a person to make a contract, in relation to his
business, is part of the liberty of the individual protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.2
The ascendancy of economic theory over traditionally
held constitutional principles caused the Court to strike down
over two hundred state police power laws until the Lochner
era ended. Substituting its own judgement for that of state
legislatures, the Court orchestrated social policy by support-
ing its own view of economics and diminishing the power of
legislatures to act as arbiter between public and private inter-
ests. Both Harlan (who authored Mugler) and Holmes (the
purported father of modern takings law) dissented in Loch-
ner, recognizing that the Court was abandoning its fundamen-
tal constitutional role and that it was not the Court's job to
promote economic theories."
19. Id. at 10,373.
20. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
21. Id. at 56.
22. Id. at 75.
19921
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The Lochner era ended by the 1940's, when the Court be-
came reluctant to continue interfering with legislative power
to protect public health, safety and welfare. Indeed, the Court
eventually returned to Munn's constitutional principles and
recognized that it was not for the Court to balance the advan-
tages or disadvantages of new legislative acts. This, it con-
cluded, was the job of legislatures. Substantive due process of
Lochnerian character was tossed onto the heap of outdated
legal theories, and the dissenting opinions of Harlan and
Holmes became mainstream once again. This, of course, im-
plied that the Court would use great judicial restraint in re-
viewing legislative acts and defer to the state legislature for
public policy.
Interestingly, at the same time that the Court was impos-
ing its will upon legislatures during the Lochner era, takings
law saw little change concerning regulation of business activi-
ties. The principles of Mugler remained intact and most of
the takings cases, including Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon28 (the cornerstone of modern takings law), were
couched in due process terms that gave little hint of judicial
concern for losses to private property owners where there was
a valid exercise of police power.
The Fifth Amendment is a latecomer to the arena of bal-
ancing public and private rights associated with police power
action, save the exception of instances where the state physi-
cally takes or occupies property. Perhaps because the Fifth
Amendment does not carry the historical baggage that the
Due Process Clause does, the modern Court has chosen it to
chart a new constitutional course unencumbered by the due
process principles of Mugler or the stigma that judicial use of
due process acquired during the Lochner era. In order to ap-
ply the Fifth Amendment, however, the Court has been forced
to rewrite constitutional history, pretend that precedent has
established the Fifth Amendment as the appropriate arbiter
for takings issues and, ironically, resurrect substantive due
process review found in Lochner under the guise of a different
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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constitutional principle. This has created significant analytical
problems because by mixing Mugler due process considera-
tions with the more recent private property considerations of
diminution in value and reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations, the Court has created an unworkable formula for de-
termining when compensation is due to regulated property
owners.
Part of the difficulty of modern takings law is that it is
founded on a misinterpretation of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.2 While Justice Rehnquist has declared this case to be
the cornerstone of modern takings law, careful reading of the
case clearly indicates that it is a Fourteenth Amendment due
process case and has absolutely nothing to do with the Fifth
Amendment. Holmes, the author of the opinion, was merely
delimiting the boundaries of the Due Process Clause and not
moving away from the majoritarian principles of Mugler. This
case stands for the proposition that where the legislative
branch oversteps the bounds of validity of purpose, it can still
have its way if it compensates the property owners affected.
In Mahon, Holmes concluded that there was no valid exercise
of police power because the legislation in question related
only to protection of private interests rather than the general
public interest and as a consequence was unconstitutional.
Thus, the famous "goes too far" language relates not so much
to the diminution in value or loss of use by the landowners as
it does to the character of the government action. Under
Holmes' theory, when government action goes beyond appro-
priate purposes that protect general health, safety and welfare
concerns, the state must pay a citizen for this unfair burden
in order to avoid due process concerns.
Members of the modern Court, however, have attempted
to turn this "goes too far" analysis upon the property owner's
loss and have wholly discounted the true meaning of Mahon.
However, Holmes' language in Mahon, linking the case philo-
sophically to republican ideology and Supreme Court cases
right up to Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedic-
24. Id.
25. See generally McGinley, supra note 18, at 10,374-75.
1992]
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tis,26 continues to give strong weight to the insulation of police
power actions from compensation requirements. These cases
have confirmed over and over again that diminution in value
and loss of use alone cannot overcome the central theme of
republicanism that recognizes an obligation to use property in
a way that is not harmful to others. 27 In fact, the Court has
never found a taking based upon the Fifth Amendment except
in instances where there has been a physical invasion.
Thus far, there has been only strong dissenting rhetoric
about private property rights and there is a serious stalemate
between the majoritarian forces on the Court and the newer
private property advocates. This stalemate has made it singu-
larly impossible for the Court to determine when a regulation
"goes too far" so as to equate a taking, and has resulted in a
doctrinal mishmash that serves only to confuse the law of tak-
ings. This gridlock is rooted in the effort to remain true to
traditional principles that grant maximum power to legisla-
tures to call in social obligations free from compensation re-
quirements and the contrary effort to reverse the flow of obli-
gation from the individual to the state by requiring payment
for regulations that affect private property rights.
In order to escape the republican tradition and the im-
possible balancing of public and private interest set forth in
the current test, some members of the Court have sought to
obtain certainty in the test by narrowing the range of police
power actions insulated from takings analysis and by subject-
ing legislative actions to closer scrutiny by the Court, as was
done in the Lochner era. In doing so, these members seek to
diminish the traditional police power authority of the legisla-
ture and increase the power of the Court to make decisions
about which regulations cross the threshold that requires
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Rehnquist has sought for some time to narrow the
range of police power actions insulated from compensation. In
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,28 the
26. 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987).
27. Id. at 490.
28. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
[Vol. 10
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/2
LUCAS COLLOQUIUM
City of New York Landmark Preservation Law prevented con-
struction of a twenty-four story office building over the his-
toric Grand Central Terminal. The owners of the building
contended that the New York City law had taken their prop-
erty in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and urged that they were entitled to compensation. The ma-
jority, in upholding the constitutionality of the law, recog-
nized that there is a broad range of police powers that are
insulated from the Fifth Amendment requirement of compen-
sation. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, made his
now famous conclusion that "[t]he nuisance exception to the
taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police power it-
self. The question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous
to the safety, health or welfare of others. '29 Under his theory,
the only police power actions that are insulated are those that
would prevent activity which amounts to a nuisance under
common law.
Justice Rehnquist's effort to increase the range of police
power activity subject to the requirement of compensation is
further amplified in his dissent in Keystone. The majority in
this case returned to Mahon and went to great lengths to cor-
rect the record concerning the true meaning of Justice
Holmes' opinion and at the same time reemphasizing the fact
that the nature of a regulation is a critical factor in determin-
ing whether a taking has occurred. The Court again specifi-
cally rejected the notion that the Mugler line of cases is dead
and the notion that police power is somehow limited to situa-
tions where the government has attempted to prevent a nui-
sance as defined by common law.30
Disagreeing with the majority's characterization of the
state act involved in Keystone, Justice Rehnquist took a de-
cidedly narrower view of what he terms the "nuisance excep-
tion." He chastised the Court for its continued deference to
republican principle and stated:
[t]he ease with which the Court moves from the recogni-
29. Id. at 145.
30. 480 U.S. at 490.
1992]
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tion of public interests to the assertion that the activity
here regulated is "akin to a public nuisance" suggests an
exception far wider than recognized in our previous cases.
"The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee," how-
ever, "is not coterminous with the police power itself,"
but is a narrow exception allowing the government to pre-
vent "a misuse or illegal use." . . . It is not intended to
allow "the prevention of a legal and essential use, an at-
tribute of its ownership."31(emphasis added).
Further clarifying the nuisance exception, Justice Rehnquist
stated:
Thus, our cases applying the "nuisance" rationale have
involved at least two narrowing principles. First, nuisance
regulations exempted from the Fifth Amendment have
rested on discrete and narrow purposes . . . Second, and
more significantly, our cases have never applied the nui-
sance exception to allow complete extinction of the value
of a parcel of property.32
Justice Rehnquist's agenda is clear. He wants to narrow
the range of police power activities that are insulated from the
requirement of compensation to those government actions
that protect serious threats to life and property. It is equally
clear that he wants to accomplish this goal by basing the tak-
ings formula upon judge-made common law nuisance theory
rather than upon legislative pronouncements about what is
important to society. Aside from the fact that this will freeze
the legislature's ability to protect against new and different
harms by only looking at common law, it does not take into
account any change in social standards or concerns. Given
that most of our environmental concerns of recent years have
little basis in common law nuisance theory, this does not bode
well for laws that attempt to develop and apply innovative
ways of dealing with newly discovered land use problems.
This effort to free the Fifth Amendment balancing test
31. Id. at 512.
32. Id. at 513.
[Vol. 10
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from its insurmountable analytical problems and to look for
more objective standards to measure when a taking has oc-
curred has taken the form of a direct attack upon the legisla-
tive prerogative and long held republican principles. However,
while Justice Rehnquist attacks the elastic nature of police
power, Justice Scalia has begun to undermine majoritarian
rule in a different way by changing the manner in which
courts review legislative decisions. Hints of this effort were
clear in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.3 3 Between
the demise of Lochner and this decision, the Court's review of
the rationality of state exercise of police power was based
upon a presumption of rationality." Thus, if a state's exercise
of police power is reasonably related to the purpose of the
state action, the Court must defer to the legislature's wisdom.
Indeed, the Court has regularly concluded that if the reasona-
bleness of a regulation is fairly "debatable," the Court will not
intervene on the behalf of private property owners to test the
correctness or intelligence of a legislative decision.3 5
Justice Scalia disregards this time-honored deference to
legislative decision making and replaces it with a test that re-
quires greater judicial scrutiny. Relying upon language from
Agins v. Tiburon,3 6 he claims that takings cases have never
"elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes
a 'legitimate state interest.' ,,37 He concludes that the Court in
reviewing state action must determine if the means "substan-
tially advance" the purposes of the act. This "substantially
advances" test thus invites courts to closely scrutinize laws
passed to protect public health, safety and welfare.
As argued by Justice Brennan, "the Court [in Nollan] im-
poses a standard of precision for the exercise of a State's po-
lice power that has been discredited for the better part of this
century." 88 Justice Brennan uncovers the clear effort on the
33. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1955).
35. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
36. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
37. 483 U.S. at 834.
38. Id. at 842.
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part of Justice Scalia to have the Court sit as a "super-legisla-
ture to weigh the wisdom of legislation []or to decide whether
the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.'"
This smacks of the intrusive substantive due process review of
the first three decades of this century, repackaged under the
guise of the Fifth Amendment. It also represents a dangerous
effort to rein in the regulatory efforts of legislatures and limit
their power to protect the public from harm.
If the Rehnquist/Scalia school of thought ultimately over-
takes traditional constitutional principles recently reaffirmed
in the majority opinion of Keystone, it is clear that environ-
mental regulation is in for a difficult time. This is true for
several reasons. First, many of the problems associated with
industrialization and urbanization do not fit in traditional
nuisance theory.'0 There is no strong body of nuisance law
that assures that legislatures can prevent inappropriate uses
of land without having to provide compensation. Take, for in-
stance, the facts of Lucas. There, the state sought to prevent
construction of a house upon lands which were unstable and
unsuitable in their natural state for construction. However, it
is questionable whether a court would determine that con-
struction of a house along the beachfront constitutes a nui-
sance, given that there is existing construction in Mr. Lucas'
neighborhood. 41 This fact, taken together with the Rehnquist
proposition that there are certain essential uses of land that in
his mind are equivalent to inalienable rights, it may be that
construction of a house upon a lot, despite its external effects
or cumulative impacts upon the beach/dune resource, may be
so important to a court that compensation will be required.
Should Mr. Lucas gain a "special permit" under the recent
amendments to the Beachfront Management Act to build
39. Id. at 843 n.1 (citing Day Bright Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423
(1952)).
40. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court must identify background
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit Mr. Lucas' intended use of his
property. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
41. The fact that other landowners are permitted to continue using property for
the use denied Mr. Lucas suggests a lack of any common law prohibition. Lucas, 112
S. Ct. at 2901.
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upon his property, he may nevertheless be entitled to com-
pensation for the temporary taking during the course of the
litigation.42
Secondly, if the Court seeks to increase its power to re-
view the wisdom of environmental legislation through the
back door by thinly disguised application of intrusive substan-
tive due process analysis, the Justices may ultimately impose
an economic theory that makes deregulation more important
than protecting the environment. A narrowing of legislative
discretion will chill the legislative ability to deal with evolving
problems and legislatures will be less able to experiment with
new means or techniques to accomplish environmental preser-
vation. More importantly, if the Court increases its power to
make policy decisions about environmental regulation, and
sees such regulation through an economic filter, the tradi-
tional social obligation owed by property owners to the com-
mon good will certainly suffer. Many environmental acts are
based upon the central principle of social obligation found in
Mugler and, without recognition of this obligation, much envi-
ronmental protection would be impossible to implement. The
Court certainly understands that buying large tracts of regu-
lated property is not a viable method for environmental pro-
tection. States simply do not have the resources to purchase
all vital beachfront property or wetlands.
Depending on the Court's treatment of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court's re-formulation of the basis for its deci-
sion, the Lucas case is unlikely to seriously affect the test for
takings. However, Lucas does have the potential for affording
the Court an opportunity to move towards Lochnerian review.
This will be far more serious than tinkering with a formula
that, even in the best light, does not work. The Court's failure
to accept the State's reliance upon the legislative findings in
the 1988 Beachfront Management Act" indicates that legisla-
tive power is waning and that the Court intends to embark
upon more extensive second-guessing of the efforts of the
body closest to the people. Worse, it may suggest that we are
42. Id. at 2891-92.
43. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
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returning to an era in which economic theory is more impor-
tant than long held constitutional principles. If this is the
case, the disruption to majoritarian democratic rule is more
threatening to society than any conclusion the Court may
make regarding compensation for Mr. Lucas.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/2
